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Abstract
What is dialogue and how can we find it?
This paper addresses this question in the con-
text of tracing the origins of communication
in human infancy. Structural criteria – such as
turn taking – have often been used to identify
genuine communication. Implementing these
criteria have led to considerable debate in re-
lation to the ‘proto-conversations’ of the two-
month-old, debates which arose in the late
1970s and are still alive today. The paper con-
siders some of the evidence from infant behav-
iour involved in these debates and in relation
to the question of infants’ awareness of the
‘meaning’ of adult facial expressions. In addi-
tion to these structural criteria it is suggested
that functional criteria such as openness and
recognition might be important for our under-
standing of the origins of dialogue. The paper
discusses the apparent paradox of language –
how communication is needed to make private
experience public, but at the same time, cannot
occur until experience is already public – and
argues that this paradox disappears if shared





“Of all affairs” said the great educationalist
and philosopher John Dewey (1925), “commu-
nication is the most wonderful”. Communica-
tion and dialogue creates and transforms the
individual and the realm of meanings, but also,
intriguingly, seems to demonstrate the recogni-
tion of another being. You would not have a
dialogue with someone unless you took for
granted, or at least hoped, that they were mind-
ed beings, capable – at some level – of under-
standing and responding. Unless you are Shirley
Valentine talking to her wall or John Cleese talk-
ing to his Mini, talk seriously to a mindless
thing and you run the risk of being labelled
mad. So if we generally reserve dialogue and
communication for creatures with minds, they
must imply a prior recognition of mentality. But
what makes an exchange a dialogue? Can we
have dialogue without content – can we have
conversations about nothing? In this work I will
look at the proto-conversations of the two-
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month-old – the face-to-face ‘chatting’ with nei-
ther words nor topic – a phenomenon which is
still controversial after many years of debate
and still central to claims about the early origins
of intersubjectivity. I will start first, though, with
the question ‘what is dialogue?’
What is dialogue?
How would you answer this question? Per-
haps you might say that to be considered dia-
logue, each partner in an interaction must have at
least some recognition of the consciousness of
the other, some kind of openness to the acts of the
other and show some taking of turns in respond-
ing to the other’s acts. The answer may seem ob-
vious, but it is far from agreed upon. And it is no
mere academic debate: doubts about the meaning
or relevance of dialogue influence how we act
and even parents in their everyday interactions
can be stricken with doubt about whether some
early exchanges are really communicative (al-
though such doubts, do not, fortunately, stop
most parents from continuing to chat with their
infants). Most of developmental psychology was
and still is sceptical about the possibility of gen-
uine communication before the end of the first
year. In trying to pin down communication, psy-
chology generally focuses on language and the
communication of ‘information’, of meanings
about things outside both partners. Simple ex-
changes of smiles and vocalisations are seen as
meaning-less in this sense, and often, as somehow
biologically driven and less than intentional.
In the sceptical atmosphere of the late 1960s
and early 1970s, Mary Catherine Bateson, (in-
spired by a film of a 9-week-old infant with
mother which she reportedly saw while she her-
self was pregnant) was the first to call the inter-
actions of two month-olds ‘proto-conversations’.
There was a strange zeitgeist in the air and the
work of several independent researchers (Berry
Brazelton, Jerome Bruner, Hanus Papousek,
Daniel Stern and Colwyn Trevarthen) began to
converge on the early communicative abilities of
very young infants (see Trevarthen, 1998). With-
in a few years infant communicative skills hit
the headlines and debates were raging. Tre-
varthen’s claim that not only were these very
young infants having ‘conversations’, but that
they involved an ‘innate intersubjectivity’ or the
ability to share and participate in another per-
son’s feelings and thoughts, was a serious chal-
lenge to mainstream views.
These early ‘communications’ were dis-
missed by some as ‘pseudo- (rather than proto-
) conversations’ (just as Piaget and others had
previously used the term ‘pseudo-imitation’).
The dismissals were motivated by cautions and
a priori theoretical convictions that came from a
variety of traditions. The behaviourist – Social
Learning Theory – tradition objected because
they sought to explain the interactions as the
result of a variety of learned associations and re-
inforcements. The newer cognitivist – or at least
Piagetian – tradition objected both because their
idea of interpersonal understanding began with
a profound childhood egocentrism and because
they were beginning to require elaborate evi-
dence of mental representational skill for coun-
tenancing any claims communication. Needless
to say, the now familiar dualism of mind and be-
haviour underpinned both these objections.
Where communication was defined as a ‘mind-
to-mind’ process, infants of that age were seen
as simply too young to be able to grasp the idea
of minds in order to communicate with them.
Where the emphasis was on a more behavioural
construct of interacting reinforcements and con-
tingencies, the behaviour of the infants (and in-
deed the adults) was seen as resulting from en-
vironmental and other behavioural constraints
with no need to invoke the fancy mentalistic la-
bels of intersubjectivity and communication.
The strongest caution, however, came from a
new tradition – social constructionism – which
resisted the individualism of Piaget and em-
braced a deep sociality from the traditions of
George Herbert Mead and Lev Vygotsky. The Nor-
wegian philosopher Ragnar Rommetveit wrote
in 1974 that “intersubjectivity has to be taken for
granted in order to be achieved” and this, now
famous, dictum was applied to infancy to mean
that it is only if mothers act ‘as-if’ their infants
could understand them that the infants actually
come to understand them. Intersubjectivity was
seen to emerge in relation, but with an interesting
twist: through a mistaken attribution by one or
both of the partners in the relation (in this case
by the mother) about the intentions and under-
standing of the other. Within this camp the theo-
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rist could remain agnostic about what the infants
in fact ‘understood’ about the other person, or
about what the infants’ actions actually ‘meant’
before the attributions were made.
However, Rommetveit’s dictum can be inter-
preted another way: that in order to initiate any
interpersonal communication the initiator must
presuppose intersubjectivity (Markova, 1982).
That is, that the infant’s initiation of communica-
tion is evidence of the infant’s recognition of an-
other’s subjectivity. Of course, not only is defining
what constitutes communication a controversial
issue, but even defining initiation is problematic –
our communications are deeply embedded in
each others’ reactions – who is to say where an in-
dividual stops responding and starts initiating?
Nonetheless, this slant takes emphasis away
from social constructionism and maternal self-
fulfilling beliefs and attributions and instead
puts the onus on our descriptions of what in-
fants do as well – do they in fact initiate inter-
personal communication? In the literature on
animal communication there is considerable ev-
idence of young mammals calling for attention
and company; in babies, however, although
there is a large literature on crying, there is a
strange neglect of positive calling (although see
Legerstee, 1994). Mothers report that by about
two or three months of age, there is a ‘calling’
tone in infant vocalisations, used when they are
not being attended to and very different from a
responsive tone used when engagement is al-
ready established; precisely what the infant is
calling the other for remains to be established:
for face-to-face attention, for physical contact,
for vocal exchanges, for entertainment. Vocal
initiations by infants within engagement, how-
ever, are commonplace, often picked up by par-
ents and imitated.
It is clear that in order to unpick this quag-
mire we need to have a good look at what con-
versations with two-month-olds are actually like.
But how do we do this?
Structural features of dialogue and
communication
One way of deciding whether an interaction
really is communication might be to look to the
structural features generally identified as oc-
curring in conversations between human adults
(with the caution that using the criteria of a
more mature version of the phenomenon carries
the risk of obscuring from our view the very ori-
gins we seek). Such features include a repertoire
of communicative acts (such as expressions,
words, gestures), self-synchrony (the ability to
produce organised and coherent actions), inter-
actional and affective synchrony (the ability to
relate your own actions and emotions to the
other’s actions and emotions), turn-taking (an
ability to take turns in acts), attentional co-ordi-
nation (i.e., the ability to know when someone is
attending to you and to co-ordinate your atten-
tion with the other’s to a third thing), reference
(i.e., the ability to point or verbally refer to
things), information content (i.e., the ability to
say something about these things), symbolism
(i.e., the ability to use arbitrary symbols to stand
for things), grammatical and textual competence
(i.e., the ability to produce and comprehend
well-formed sentences and to link sentences to-
gether to convey large amounts of information)
and socio-linguistic competence (i.e., the ability
to discriminate between the rules and needs of
different situations and audiences). Over the
course of the first year infant communication
develops to show at least some competence in
most of these features. How does communica-
tion begin?
Trevarthen and his student, the late Penny
Hubley, conducted a classic study of a baby
called Tracy, following her monthly from the
first month through to the end of the first year.
They found several distinctive changes in her
interests and her ‘communicative’ actions with
her mother over the course of the first year:
most notable among these were the onset of in-
tense face to face chatting at around two
months, shifting to a marked interest in the en-
vironment at three to four months, leading to a
period of games in the middle of the first year as
the mother, fed up with the infant’s wandering
attention, used rhythmic games and songs to
keep the baby chatting, and finally, from about 9
months to the onset of a triadic interaction be-
tween mother, baby and the objects around
them. Trevarthen distinguished between the na-
ture of communication at two months which he
called primary intersubjectivity, and that at 9 to
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12 months, which he called secondary intersub-
jectivity. These labels and the engagements they
refer to have now become part of the furniture
for students of developmental psychology. But
the interpretation of the exchanges at two
months is still hotly debated by theorists.
It is the first four features in the list above
which Trevarthen highlights as particularly sig-
nificant for his argument that the smiling, coo-
ing and ‘chatting’ of the two-month-old are con-
versational and intentionally communicative.
First, these actions are in themselves significant
as precursors of adult speech movements, in-
volving lip movements and movements of the
tongue inside the mouth during and prior to
vocalisations he called ‘pre-speech’ movements,
that is, movements of the appropriate organs
even before speech. These occur in co-ordina-
tion with smiles, vocalisations, and arm move-
ments. In other words, two-month-old infants
are using communicative behaviours which we
as adults recognise as such. Second, they are
coherent. That is, these behaviours are not ran-
dom emissions but co-occur in organised pat-
terns. In the same way that when we turn to
talk to someone we may look, smile, adjust our
bodies and say something all at the same time,
the two-month-old infant’s smiles, vocalisations
and arm movements also occur together in a
pattern. Various body parts are involved in vocal
conversation, each often moving in different di-
rections and at different velocities but main-
taining a relationship with one another and
constituting a ‘movement bundle’, revealing
what some have called ‘self-synchrony’. Third,
the infant behaviours occur in conversational
turns, with first one partner and then the other,
‘saying’ something, rather than in a chaotic
overlap. Many studies have found a minimal
overlap of vocalisations between infant and
mother. Fourth, they express emotions which
are reciprocally related to the emotions of oth-
ers, implying some kind of recognition of what
others’ emotional expressions mean. While the
first two features (the presence and coherence
of ‘communicative’ behaviours) are unchal-
lenged, the last two are controversial, and pro-
vide the key both to understanding how infant
communication begins and develops and to
how communication relates to the awareness
of other minds.
Turn-taking and engagement
One criticism of turn-taking comes from
Kenneth Kaye who argued that much as Fred
Astaire famously danced the tango with a hat
stand, mothers in fact create an illusion of inter-
co-ordination. During early feeding interactions
mothers tend to jiggle their babies between their
bursts of sucking, an alternation that looks very
much like a coordinated dialogue. Mothers be-
lieve that the jiggling helps to provoke the baby
to start sucking again. In fact, he says, the jig-
gling has remarkably little effect on the infant. It
serves simply to give the mother the illusion of a
conversation and to set the pattern of turns for
the future. In the same way, he argues, it could
be that the turn-taking pattern of conversations
with two-month-olds is created by the mothers
slotting their responses into the gaps between
the infant’s acts, rather than by the infant ac-
tively waiting for its turn. The effect could be a
‘pseudo-dialogue’ in which the infant simply
does her bit, regardless of what the mother
does. That is, the coordination could be merely
apparent, with the infant’s actions not ‘respons-
es’ to, or dependent on, the mother’s. Indeed
some argued that you could in fact impose this
gloss on the exchanges between two month-olds
and their mothers (Kaye, 1982). While the moth-
er’s acts may not really matter to the infant, the
mother could be taking note of the infant’s ut-
terances and acts, and by unconscious use of
the gaps, creating the illusion that the infants
are responding in coherent turns. Such an illu-
sion could be really useful – helping to shape
the mother’s interactive behaviour to the infant
and promote the infant’s development – but ul-
timately it would be an illusion.
Is such turn-taking really illusory? Are the in-
fant’s responses not responses at all, but inde-
pendent acts? It was to answer this sort of ques-
tion that three separate labs (Colwyn
Trevarthen’s, Hanus and Mechthilde Papousek’s
and Ed Tronick’s) developed what have become
known as perturbation experiments. Lynne Mur-
ray, then a doctoral student of Trevarthen’s, de-
veloped what she called the ‘blank face test’
(Trevartehn, 1977), a test which Ed Tronick, in-
dependently and famously developed as the ‘still
face experiments’ (Tronick, Als, Adamson, Wise
& Brazelton, 1978). In these experiments, all you
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have to do is to get a ‘conversation’ going with a
baby and in the middle of it just hold your face
still in a pleasant expression, continuing to look
at the baby but not talking or responding in any
way. If your responses don’t really matter, the
baby should carry on ‘emitting’ her acts regard-
less. But they do matter, sometimes dramatically
so (Reddy & Trevarthen, 2004).
Many versions of the still face study have
now been published – and distress in the infants
to the unresponsiveness of a partner has been
demonstrated time and again (see reviews by
Tronick, 2003; Adamson & Frick 2003; Mesman,
van Ijzendoorn & Bakermans-Kranenburg,
2009). The infants’ negative reaction is worse
when the still-faced person is their mother –
someone they are familiar with – and worse
when the person holds the still-face while look-
ing at them. The infants seem to have strong
and ‘sensible’ expectancies for the other person’s
actions in relation to them: the mother’s inac-
tion evidently affects the infant’s responses. The
responses of infants whose mothers have post-
partum depression, however, show little differ-
ence from ‘normal’ conversational conditions,
suggesting that their experiences may not have
established these stable expectations.
There is other evidence that early conversa-
tions involve genuine turn-taking: Ed Tronick
and his colleagues showed that even in struc-
tural terms the interaction at two months is ap-
propriately describable as a conversation. The
mother emits a large number of what are called
turn-yielding signals common to adult conver-
sation (such as changing intonation, drawling,
moving the head, and occasionally the hands, at
the end of a ‘turn’) and the infant modifies her
behaviour in relation to these signals, particu-
larly in relation to intonation changes, starting
at such points to smile and vocalise more. The
infant is not an equal partner in the dialogue,
but does take turns and does participate active-
ly in it. Simultaneous (or co-active and overlap-
ping) vocalisations between infant and mother
also occur, as Daniel Stern showed, but they ap-
pear to occur more during high arousal times
such as during active play, when both may laugh
or squeal together. The co-occurrence of such
vocalisations, or of non-vocal facial and gestural
expressions, does not seriously limit the ability
to take in what the other is doing at the same
time. It is only later when the linguistic content
of the vocal utterances becomes important that
it is necessary for the infant (or adult) to wait in
complete silence while another makes an utter-
ance. Although, it is certainly the case that
adults don’t always wait during conversations,
as anybody who has tried to transcribe a tape of
a conversation has painfully discovered. Still,
conversations are held and understood.
The answers from these studies showed
clearly that a lack of response is noticed by and
matters to the two-month-old. Infants show
signs of attempting to regain the mother’s en-
gagement, as well as signs of distress when they
fail to do so. However, what does this mean? It
could be that the infant simply finds the rather
odd behaviour of the mother – different from
what she has been used to – upsetting. It could
be the difference rather than the unresponsive-
ness per se that the infant dislikes. To explore
this question, Lynne Murray, influenced by a
visit to the Papouseks’ laboratory in Munich in
1975, devised with Trevarthen an ingenious ex-
periment involving closed circuit television.
They got two-month-olds to interact with their
mothers through television monitors. That is,
the baby was looking into a monitor in which
his/her mother’s face could be seen, live, and
the mother was, similiarly, looking into a moni-
tor that framed her infant’s face. The two part-
ners were then encouraged to interact as usual;
despite the strangeness of this technological me-
diation, it was clear (judging by the vocalisa-
tions and facial expressions of both) that per-
fectly happy interactions could occur between
mothers and infants. Importantly for the pro-
cedure, the behaviour that each partner dis-
played during these live interactions could be
surreptitiously video-taped. So, once happy in-
teraction had been established (and taped) for a
while, the video-tape would be surreptitiously
rewound, and unbeknown to both infant and
mother, replayed to them. Instead of seeing the
mother live, the infant would now view the
mother as she had been a few minutes earlier.
The results showed that infants reacted in much
the same way as they did during the paradigm
of the still face. That is, they showed fewer
smiles, looked away, exhibited more closed
mouth expressions, and intermittently attempt-
ed to regain interaction. In short, they could de-
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tect the changes in the mother’s behaviour.
Even when the mother was smiling and chatting
– the very same smiles and conversational offer-
ings from the mother that had a minute previ-
ously produced happy responses in the infant –
the infant looked sober and wary.
Clearly it was not just odd behaviour by the
mother which was disliked by the infant. A few
minutes earlier, the infants had responded hap-
pily to the very same behaviour. The problem
seemed to be the inappropriateness of the re-
sponses, the fact that the mother’s behaviour
was not a response to what the infant did. In-
terestingly, the mothers – who were unaware of
what was happening – also reacted with puz-
zlement to their babies’ behaviour. They could
still see the baby live, but did not know that the
baby was no longer viewing a live image of the
mothers themselves. The mothers could detect,
however, that the babies were no longer engaged
with them and that they were behaving oddly
and unresponsively. The mothers thus also be-
came less engaged, starting to speak and inter-
act with less ‘motherese’ (the typical higher
pitched and exaggerated utterances most adults
unthinkingly use when speaking to babies). The
specific responses of the two-month-old seemed
to matter to the adult as much as the specific re-
sponses of the adult mattered to the infant
(Murray, 1980; Murray & Trevarthen, 1985;
Nadel et al. 1999)
Instances of mis-communication are not
limited to experimental manipulations. As Ed
Tronick and his colleagues have shown, they
happen all the time in normal interaction, with
periods of mis-coordination and repair (getting
in tune again) alternating every few seconds.
When infants chronically experience prolonged
mis-coordinated interactions without the expe-
rience of the repair, that they seem to regularly
withdraw from the other person, showing be-
haviour such as turning away, having dull look-
ing eyes, poor postural control, much oral self-
comforting (e.g., fingers in the mouth), rocking
and self-clasping. This is also the sort of reac-
tion that has been noted in many studies of
post-natal depression or in situations of neglect.
Interestingly, such infants show more looking
away during still-face experiments than do in-
fants who have had more normal experience of
repair of interactions. Other studies have shown
that lack of experience of interactive repairs
seems to lead to later problems in elaborating
communicative skills and problems in the es-
tablishment of a positive ‘affective core’ and a
sense of effectiveness. These studies show us
very slightly exaggerated versions of what the
infant normally experiences, and show us how
much mis-communication does matter in every-
day life if failure to repair it becomes chronic
(Tronick, 1989; Gianino & Tronick, 1988).
Reciprocal communication of affects
So, the infant’s interactions with adults at
two months show clear evidence of engagement,
with some evidence of turn-taking by infants.
The claim that they are merely pseudo-conver-
sations does not stand up. But what does this
engagement actually say about the infant’s
knowledge of the (m)other’s mind? According
to the Hungarian Gyorgy Gergely, a very recent
critic of the intersubjectivity argument, the in-
fant is equipped with a capacity for contingency
detection which says nothing at all about inter-
subjectivity or mind knowledge. That is, just
because the infant can respond in a timely fash-
ion to mother’s actions, or detect the untimeli-
ness of hers, does not mean that the infant is en-
gaging psychologically – communicating – with
the other. Gergely argues that this capacity –
i.e., the infant’s ability to detect the close tem-
poral sequencing of events such as ‘I gurgle –
mother smiles’ – allows infants (like adults) to
feel causally effective (or ‘empowered’ to use
adult jargon) and therefore positively aroused.
Combined with some predispositions to engage
in affective displays and interactions (the moti-
vation for which is inexplicable unless conceived
of as ‘hard-wired’ action patterns), contingency
detection alone, he argues, is sufficient to ex-
plain the interactive behaviour of the two-
month–old. Primary intersubjectivity, according
to him, is a myth. Building on John Watson’s
theory about the effects of experiencing different
kinds of contingencies, Gergely further links
contingency detection to the subsequent forma-
tion by the child of theories of mind (Gergely,
2003; 2004; Gergely & Watson, 1996).
This theory has clear assumptions. Attribut-
ing physical-temporal contingency detection to
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the infant is seen as acceptable, while attribut-
ing emotional-psychological feature detection
is not. Attributing a rudimentary understanding
of the causality of physical events is seen as ac-
ceptable while attributing a rudimentary under-
standing of the psychological meaning of acts is
not. The distinction here is that physical things
can be perceived and understood by babies, but
mental things cannot be perceived and can
therefore only be inferred and theorised – a
clear mind-behaviour dualism. However, the
problem with dualisms aside, is it the case that
very young infants detect only the temporal re-
lations of interpersonal acts and not their emo-
tional relations or relevance?
To answer this question we need to look in
detail at the content of the engagement, not sim-
ply at its contingent nature. Trevarthen argues
that what the two-month-old is doing is engag-
ing in a communication of emotions. She is re-
vealing her emotional state and is perceiving
the emotional state of her partner as it relates to
her. The emotional tone expressed by each part-
ner is not identical, but reciprocal. That is, some
emotional states are most appropriately re-
sponded to with the same emotion – such as joy
and pleasure – but others are most appropriate-
ly responded to with a different emotional tone.
Anger for instance could more appropriately
evoke a response of distress or even fear, force-
fulness could evoke a response of withdrawal
and reticence a response of boldness. Ed Tron-
ick’s ‘mutual regulation model’ argues that in-
fants at two months are not only engaging in
just such a reciprocal affective interaction, but
trying to influence and maintain the partner’s
affective state.
The evidence for infant responses to emo-
tional expressions and emotional tone in oth-
ers is still sparse and somewhat contradictory.
On the one hand there is evidence to show that
even newborns (at 36 hours after birth) dis-
criminate between the posed expressions of hap-
piness, sadness and surprise, responding to each
with different but appropriate imitative actions
although infants of mothers who were de-
pressed seemed to show less expressiveness to
surprise and happy expressions (Field, Wood-
son, Greenberg & Cohen, 1982; Lindy & Field,
1996). Newborns respond to distress vocalisa-
tions of other infants (but not their own), played
via audio equipment, with facial signs of dis-
tress and a reduction in non-nutritive sucking
(Dondi, Simion & Coltran, 1999). Two month-
olds (but interestingly not five month-olds) can
discriminate happy from neutral expressions
posed in a holographic image (Nelson &
Horowitz, 1983). Young infants also seem to
prefer to look more at certain facial expressions
(such as joy) than at others (such as anger)
(Izard & Malatesta, 1987). Different kinds of
maternal expressions have a different impact on
the infant: gentle friendly approaches often lead
to smiles and increased interest, while vocal and
facial displays of anger lead to upset or fearful
responses and displays of sadness lead to self-
soothing (increased ‘tongueing’) behaviour even
in 10 week old infants (Haviland & Lelwica,
1987). These infant emotional responses do not
show a passive mirroring of whatever the adult
experiences, rather they seem to show some ap-
preciation of the other’s expression in context
and a response to it. Three month-olds whose
mothers report more anger during an interac-
tion themselves express more anger, but three
month-olds whose mothers reported more sad-
ness express more distress (Hamilton, 1990). In
short, the two-month-old appears to be sensi-
tive to micro-emotional shifts in others’ expres-
sions within engagement: when maternal mood
shifts downward from the positive to the slight-
ly negative, infants in the seconds following can
show a rapid decrease in ‘brightness’ and shift in
attention (Hatzinikolaou, 2002).
On the other hand, there is evidence sug-
gesting that although it is easy to show discrim-
ination in three month-olds between different
expressions of the same person in photographs,
this discrimination does not clearly generalise
across different faces or to different orientations
of faces (for instance, upside-down faces). This
has led to the conclusion that what is being dis-
criminated may not be the expressions per se,
but some features of their occurrence in the on-
going context. That is, it may be that the two-
month-old infant does not have a categorical
awareness – a concept – of particular emotional
expressions, and that not until after six or seven
months of age is there consistent evidence that
the infant not only treats facial expressions as
examples of a general category, but also seems
to link them meaningfully to things in the out-
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side world. The meaning of emotional expres-
sions for the two-month-old seems to be an in-
teractive meaning rather than an abstracted one.
That an interactive meaning is present is shown
clearly by infant responses to affect in actual
engagement, both when affect is experimentally
simulated and when it is real (see also Adamson,
1995).
Trying to distinguish between mere contin-
gencies and affective responsiveness, Maria Leg-
erstee from Toronto measured the extent of af-
fective mirroring that different mothers showed
in live interaction. Still using the double video
paradigm, and dividing mothers into high af-
fect mirroring and low affect mirroring groups,
she found that the three-month-old babies of
both groups of mothers were able to detect the
contingency violation of the replay condition
and respond to it with greater averted gaze.
However, the babies of the high affect mirroring
group not only showed greater smiling, gaze
and melodic vocalisations in the live interac-
tions, but showed greater negative reactions dur-
ing the replay, although in the group where the
replay was shown first, they did recover their
interest during the live condition, unlike the ba-
bies of the low affect mirroring group. This
complex study raises as many further questions
as it addresses. It suggests, however, that affec-
tive engagement between infants and mothers is
a reality which sets infants up for greater nega-
tiveness when the engagement is disrupted but
also greater confidence in accepting it when it
returns (Legerstee & Varghese, 2001). Moreover,
even the 5-week-old babies of highly affectively
attuned mothers discriminate between normal
engagement (with intermittent rather than per-
fectly matching contingencies) and imitative
(closely contingent) or non-contingent displays
by the mother, while the babies of les affectively
attuned mothers don’t (Markova & Legerstee,
2006). The direction of influence in this study
seems to be from affective response to contin-
gency rather than the other way round!
Maternal depression provides a difficult situ-
ation where infants experience prolonged expo-
sure to a partner who is not always contingently
responsive and shows flattened affect, more fa-
cial and vocal sadness, often more anger and
less joyfulness. Infants are rapidly affected by
such interactions, themselves picking up the af-
fective patterns and showing them even when
interacting with other people. Interestingly even
the brief simulation of depression by the mother
(interacting in an emotionally flat and with-
drawn manner) has a negative impact on the in-
fant’s ability to engage with others, leading to
more flatness of affect and withdrawal in the in-
fant (Cohn & Tronick, 1983). Tiffany Field sug-
gests that these infants may learn ‘helplessness’
and have an impaired sense of control in their
engagements – a theory which can explain Leg-
erstee’s findings. However, there is room for
optimism: these effects can be alleviated with
appropriate interventions. Field reports the re-
assuring results of an intervention programme in
which mothers with depression were trained in
simple ways to respond contingently to their in-
fants, to imitate them and show more positive af-
fect. Infants and mothers improved in their com-
munication with each other and with others. Are
the infants of depressed mothers learning ‘how
to be’ from the mother as a model? Is the mother
providing a sort of ‘maternal prototype’? Recent
suggestions that later in the first year the babies
of depressed mothers may in fact be more ac-
tive – in terms of gaze and movements – than the
babies of ‘normal’ mothers suggests that the sit-
uation may be more complex, at least in the sec-
ond half of the first year (Selby & Bradley, 2003).
A responsive – or compensatory – model of the
engagement of affects seems more appropriate
than a modelling one. This implies something
like a dialogic process.
The idea that the two-month-old detects only
temporal contingencies and not the emotional
relations or relevance of interpersonal acts
therefore cannot be upheld. In attempting to re-
ject the overly nativist heritage of infant com-
munication research, Gergely’s rejection of the
two month old as communicator seems to adopt
the trappings of the very Cartesian model it is
opposed to. It clings to a mind-behaviour dual-
ism by distinguishing the physical features that
infants can supposedly detect from the psycho-
logical features they supposedly cannot and by
disallowing the infant from meaningful percep-
tion of emotion. Gergely argues that the dispo-
sitional meanings of emotion are gained by the
infant simply from observation of the action
consequences of the emotion displays produced
by others (Gergely, 2004). This is a fundamen-
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tally third person theory – the observer deduces
all, even the feeling of emotions. There is no
room here for emotional responses in the in-
fant as constituting either the dispositional
meanings of the observed displays or indeed
even as influencing the emotional displays
themselves. Ed Tronick uses a notion called
dyadic expansion to capture the way in which
the infant’s experiences can expand in complex-
ity within a dyadic base: dyadic engagement
stretches the infant a step beyond her capacities,
drawing her into skills and embedding her in
patterns of feeling and doing that she would not
otherwise have had access to (Tronick, 2005).
These patterns afford a coherence to infant – or
indeed adult – experience. They are what we
know and can know more through. They serve
to invite infants into our culture, but can just as
easily be advantageous as negative and disad-
vantageous. Armed with such coherent ‘affec-
tive centres of gravity’ the infant is repeatedly
pulled towards them (Panksepp & Smith-
Pasqualini, 2005). In new interactions the in-
fant acts – as do adults – in ways which repro-
duce such exchanges and feelings which at least
have the advantage of being familiar and coher-
ent. This induces a corresponding affective
ethos even in new partners who sense and re-
spond to whatever ‘dis-connecting’ messages the
infant is offering and inviting.
In sum, infant communication at two
months seems to be much more than the detec-
tion of contingencies, involving a degree of sen-
sitivity to particular emotional expressions in
others, and to the emotional tone of interac-
tions – what Daniel Stern calls ‘vitality contours’.
These are the rhythms and tempos of ordinary
actions, present in everything we do and say,
and generally far harder to conceal and disguise
than what we normally call emotional expres-
sions. The meaningful perception of emotion in
others may, according to Trevarthen, be the key
to the evolution of affect. According to him and
according to some communicative rather than
‘read-out’ theories of the evolution of affective
expression, emotions evolved because they were
meaningfully perceived by others (Fridlund,
1994). There is no point in being able to smile
unless there is someone out there to feel its im-
pact. There is no point in being able to express
sadness unless someone can perceive and re-
spond to it. Whether or not this was the case in
evolution, the affective communication of the
two-month-old shows not only a sensitivity to
the relevance and appropriateness of others’
emotional expressions and rhythms, but also a
remarkable ability to learn about their mean-
ings from the responses of others to their own
emotions. The expression of emotion seems tru-
ly reciprocal in the sense that we are constantly
expressing emotion in relation to the ongoing
responses of others – their meanings changing
for us, perhaps throughout life.
Functional features of dialogue and
communication: openness and
recognition
Is this the only way in which we can ask
whether something really is communication and
dialogue? There is something very unsatisfying
about using structural criteria to identify a
process of affective engagement. There have
been innumerable attempts across a variety of
disciplines to capture something that, like ‘qual-
ity’, is better experienced rather than reduced.
Two aspects of such attempts at identifying what
might be called ‘functional’ features of dialogues
are ‘openness’ and ‘mutual recognition’. These
are vague concepts and may be better studied as
properties of the relation rather than of the in-
dividuals involved in it; but the challenge they
pose does need to be addressed. Dialogue can-
not be scripted and pre-determined. It must pos-
sess within it the possibility of going down a
road which none of those engaged in it could
have known about. When Martin Buber spoke
about dialogue he was capturing something of
this quality of openness as well as the potential
for dramatic change that openness to the un-
known allows:
for what I call dialogue, there is essentially
necessary the moment of surprise…. The
whole charm ….is that I do not know and
cannot know what my partner will do. I am
surprised by what he does and on this sur-
prise the whole play is based (Kirschenbaum
& Henderson, 1989, p. 57).
And genuine dialogue – where each is really
open to the other – involves what many have
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called a ‘confirmation’ or ‘recognition’ by the
other. In every engagement, according to Hegel,
there is the risk of not being ‘recognised’ by the
other in the way one has acted – it is only when
we are recognised by another person that we re-
ceive confirmation about ourselves. If the en-
gagements in early infancy show features of
this openness to and being recognised by the
other, this may show us how second-person re-
lations really do work in the lives of infants and
adults.
We take the unscripted quality of our con-
versations for granted, but it is precisely this
that keeps us alive in our engagement, whether
with the physical world or the social world.
When things are open, the unexpected and the
novel can happen, and whether rewarding or
conflictual, they demand resolution and expla-
nation – making a ‘lived story’ as Stern puts it.
And when such moments are shared, something
bigger than either of the participants is released.
“The moment when someone can participate in
another’s lived story, or can create a mutually
lived story with them, a different kind of hu-
man contact is created” (Stern, 2004).
Does mother-infant interaction show these
features? Infants certainly can be surprised by
others’ acts – this is evident in all of the pertur-
bation studies – showing that infants have at
least by two months already built up expecta-
tions of what the other person will do, and what
the engagement will be like. It is also evident
that infants are pretty sensitive to subtle fluctu-
ations in others’ moods and expressions, once
again revealing their expectations from the re-
lation. Their own acts in the engagement are
influenced by the acts they experience from oth-
ers: in terms of the openness of the infant-adult
engagement, there is no doubt that we are deal-
ing here with an open system. To use Ed Tron-
ick’s theory of dyadic states of consciousness, it
seems that even at two months we are dealing
with engagement in which both partners are
open to and influenced by the other. Dan Stern’s
notion of ‘now’ moments – where this openness
results in startling moments of change and shift
of gear in the relationship – may be useful to
identify just how infant engagements with other
people actually develop through emotional sen-
sitivity to the unpredictable (Stern, 2004).
Infants also seem to need the unpredictable
and the surprising – the totally predictable is
boring. And when they start to dis-engage from
adult engagements, even if briefly, adults often
introduce intentional perturbations and viola-
tions of expectation – creating variations of in-
tensity and action in games and songs and
speech – primarily to keep the infants’ interest
continually engaged. Such intentional viola-
tions, however, aren’t done by infants until a few
months later as we will see when we discuss
teasing by infants. But once they start, they take
the lead and do it to extents that adults wouldn’t
do to them! Openness and unpredictability is
central to teasing (and more generally, to play-
fulness) – and infants, are beginning to engage
in acts which seem deliberately aimed at sur-
prising other people – they tease and show-off
and clown – with intense enjoyment. Confirma-
tion or recognition of the other can happen – or
not happen – in many ordinary ways. In all the
perturbation experiments the adult (whether the
parent under instruction to hold a still face or
the experimenter manipulating the video replay)
is explicitly not confirming the infant – not ac-
knowledging or recognising the infant’s previ-
ous acts or the infant herself. Mothers and other
adults asked to engage in still-face experiments
sometimes report finding them emotionally dif-
ficult – this is why: they are being asked to act
as if the infant isn’t there – to not acknowledge
the infant. Blank unresponsiveness may be a
harsher ‘disconfirmation’ of the partner in in-
teraction than explicit challenge or rejection of
the other. We do this in everyday life all the time
– sometimes accidentally, sometimes deliber-
ately – and often leaving minor damage in our
wake whether we know it or not. The perturba-
tion studies show us (and in this they have suc-
ceeded in a moral victory) that it matters enor-
mously to infants – even in these early months.
Communicative Intentions:
Towards mutuality
Nonetheless, two month-olds’ behaviour is
still (at least implicitly) relegated to the category
of pseudo-communication. According to a mod-
ern ‘cognitivist’ argument most clearly expressed
by Michael Tomasello, infants neither have com-
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municative intentions themselves nor under-
stand communicative intentions in others until
they are about 9 months old.
The theory goes like this. To engage in gen-
uine communication (rather than just interac-
tion,) the organism (infant, animal or alien)
needs both to have communicative intentions
and to understand that the other organism has
them. Communicative intentions are not ordi-
nary intentions, for example those which are di-
rected towards things in the world. They are dif-
ferent in that they are directed towards minds
and mental (or intentional) states. To be direct-
ed towards minds, communicative intentions
must involve an ‘intentional object’ – a thing
which is represented in the mind; they must be
‘about’ something. Shared ‘topics’ of communi-
cation are not evident until the end of the first
year, either in terms of the infant referring to
them or in terms of the infant understanding
the adult’s reference to them, and therefore, it is
concluded, the two month-old neither has com-
municative intentions nor understands them in
others.
Communicative intentions, in this view, are
seen as plans for action that exist in one mind
and are directed towards another mind. The
body is seen as a tool for conveying the com-
municative intention, not in itself intentional or
expressive. The successful communication, then,
is the idea that exists in one mind about the
idea that exists in the other mind. It follows
from this that until hidden entities can be con-
ceptualised (late in infancy) communicative in-
tentions cannot exist (the infant has no idea of a
mind to direct them to) and cannot be under-
stood (the infant has no idea of a mind from
which something might be coming). This as-
sumption of the mind-to-mind nature of inten-
tional communication seems fairly firmly
founded on a dualism between mind and bodily
movements.
From that perspective, the two-month-old’s
expressions of emotion towards another person,
her reciprocal responses to the expressions of
others, her seeking of engagement in face-to-
face contact with other persons and her adjust-
ment to patterns of engagement become an ir-
relevance to communication. They are bodily
reactions to the bodily movements of others;
they are not mental actions directed to others or
reactions to the mental actions of others. They
can be dismissed as bodily and biological be-
cause they are not representationally mediated.
Referring to the two-month-old’s reported
inability to perceive others’ perceptions of the
outside world, Tomasello argues “When the in-
fant did not understand that others perceive and
relate to an outside world there could be no
question of how they perceived and related to
me”. The grasp of a mental object is seen as a
necessary pre-requisite for understanding that
others want to communicate “for understanding
that someone else wants me to attend to X, that
is, for understanding a communicative inten-
tion” (Tomasello, 1999). Tomasello is reflecting a
generally held belief that there must be a sepa-
rate object in mind which is shared by both
partners for the sharing to be called genuinely
communicative (if we are talking about com-
munication) or for it to be called genuinely joint
attentional (if we are talking about attention)
or genuinely joint intentional (if we are talking
about intention). In other words, the crucial as-
sumption is that acts between people must be
mediated by representations of something else if
they are to be genuinely mental. This implies
that for me to genuinely communicate with you
I need an intermediary – an idea, an object, an
instruction, some other entity which you and I
can share. There is, in this view, no direct rela-
tion possible in Buber’s terms of an I-Thou rela-
tion. Or at least, it does not constitute mental re-
lation, only bodily. The insistence on an ‘object’
for communication, then, is also the result of a
continuing, if unintended, commitment to a
mind-body dualism.
Such an approach to communication adopts
a traditional ‘telegraph’ metaphor, in which you
need a sender, a receiver, a common code and a
message. Just as in telegraphy, everything is be-
lieved to happen in a nice tidy sequence with
each act of communication involving a clear
sender and a clear receiver and a clear prior in-
tention and message. But neither in infants nor
in adults is there such a sequentiality and indi-
viduality to communicative intentions, nor are
communicative intentions preformed and in ex-
istence prior to the communication itself. Al-
though we can and sometimes do talk to each
other in this way – planning to say something,
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conveying the message and waiting for a re-
sponse – communication is often far more
chaotic and synchronous. Many writers, John
Shotter and Alan Fogel to name two, argue per-
suasively that meanings, intentions and com-
municative intentions change and unfold within
the process of interaction and therefore it makes
no sense to look for communicative intentions
and meanings as things independent of inter-
action (Shotter, 1998). In what he calls a ‘con-
tinuous process model’ Alan Fogel argues that
communication can imply “a negotiated and dy-
namic process in which whatever is shared is
created through the process of co-regulation:
not known by one person in advance and com-
municated as a message to the other” (Fogel,
1993, p. 3).
The paradox of communication
There is a strange paradox about communi-
cation. Language is often seen as the tool which
opens the door to private mental experience.
The use of language in dialogue can make pri-
vate experience public. We speak of dumb ani-
mals and speechless infants and say that if only
they could talk, we would know what they think
and feel. Communication is seen as leading to
the sharing of minds. This makes a lot of sense,
at least in our highly verbal culture.
However, how does the infant acquire the
means to use language to share mental experi-
ence? In order to use language, we must already
know what is meant by it, and indeed that some-
thing is meant. Before a word can be shared,
its meaning must already be shared in order to
know what the word stands for, and people have
to be understood as having minds with mean-
ings. In other words, in order to communicate,
we must already understand that others under-
stand and what they understand.
Put this way we have a paradox. Communi-
cation is necessary to know about minds, but
communication implies that we already know
about minds. How do we resolve this? Paradox-
es are frustrating things. But this one may be
more apparent than real. It emerges from as-
suming that the communication of meanings is
a representational act. That is, that the content
of a communication (represented in the mind)
has to precede communication itself.
Ludwig Wittgenstein showed that if you as-
sume that representation precedes communica-
tion, you cannot explain communication at all.
You have no way of explaining how the shared
meanings originated in the first place. A mean-
ing must be public – or shared – in order for it
to be used in conversation or communication.
The apparent paradox we have been considering
then is simply a function of putting the meta-
physical cart before the horse, by assuming that
mind and the contents of mind (meanings) are
private before they become public. If we accept
Wittgenstein’s solution the question becomes:
what meanings does the infant share with
adults? When and how do these meanings
emerge? If communication is taken as primary
(i.e., if we accept the ‘hermeneutic circle’ in this
question) the paradox disappears. Words, and
gestures, can only achieve their meaning if they
are grounded already in shared agreement
about what they mean or refer to. They have to
be grounded in shared meaning before they ever
emerge as separable and represent-able mean-
ings. But they cannot do this in the absence of
engagement. Thus, communication both sets
the ground for, and reflects, mind knowledge.
“Nothing will come of nothing: speak again”
said King Lear to his favourite daughter (King
Lear, Act 1, Scene 1). Communicative intentions
cannot emerge out of their total absence. They
develop, but from a ground which is simpler,
the further back you go in developmental time.
Intentional communication is evident from ear-
ly infancy. Its development is primarily in its
referents, its informational content and its
scope. The processes of intentional communi-
cation become more complex over time, but
they do not emerge, belatedly, as a result of in-
ferences about others’ mentality after many
months of pseudo-communication. They must
be already be present in the early communica-
tive engagements of the two-month-old.
Summary
So, is the communication of the two month-
old intersubjective? Does it show the infant’s
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awareness of the other as a person, a psycho-
logical being? All depends of course, on what
we mean by a person and a psychological being.
The structural and functional features of dia-
logue and communication explored here can
throw light on questions concerning the infant’s
awareness of the other. Dismissals of the ‘con-
versations’ and complex interactional sensitivi-
ties of the two-month-old as pseudo-communi-
cation or mere contingency detection reveal
dualist assumptions about the (im)possibility of
interpersonal understanding without represen-
tation. The two month old seems to both invite
and reveal a recognition of the psychological
qualities of people.
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